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Environmental ethics is a philosophical field that specifically analyses human relationships with the nonhuman natural world. It focuses on how we view and behave towards other species, ecosystems, and the environment as a whole. This area of philosophy analyses what ethical responsibility we have towards the environment and the nonhuman world, under what conditions, and in what circumstances. Environmental ethics uses other specific philosophical and ethical frameworks but applies them in an environmental context, with such examples as: eco-phenomenology, eco-feminism, environmental pragmatism, and environmental virtue ethics. It has also established a number of ’non-anthropocentric’ positions that are distinct to this field, such as: deep ecology, ecocentrism, and biocentrism. These frameworks were first formulated in opposition to the anthropocentric worldview, which they blame for many of the environmental problems we face today.
Anthropocentrism views humans as the centre of ethical concern, while the environment is often seen as a usable resource, there for our personal exploitation. It is the position that has dominated Western thought, but gained its most destructive momentum following the Enlightenment period. Anthropocentrism justifies protecting the environment for human needs, whether it is in the form of aesthetic, economic, or social benefit. It attaches intrinsic value to humans solely, while the nonhuman world contains only instrumental valueŻa value as a means to some further ends. Intrinsic value loosely means value in itself, that we contain value as ends in ourselves, regardless of whether or not we are also useful as a means to some other ends. The differentiation is vital in environmental ethics because it is the main fundamental contrivance between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism.
Non-anthropocentrism takes a different approach to the environment, as it attaches intrinsic value to the nonhuman world, as well as the human world. It claims that philosophers have tended to ethically devalue the nonhuman world in the past, but now there is a need to re-evaluate these views in order to take a morally just position towards the environment. Non-anthropocentrism endorses an environmental ethic that respects and values other living and nonliving entities as part of our moral community. There are many different non-anthropocentric positions, but three of the most predominant ones are ecocentrism, biocentrism, and deep ecology.
Biocentrism claims that all individual biological species have moral worth, and we have a duty or obligation towards them. It determines that our ethical obligation is towards individual entities, because each organism contains life, and this life should be respected because it has intrinsic value. Ecosystems, species, the biosphere, and ecological communities do not have moral worth, just the individual parts or species that they consist of.
Ecocentrism institutes a ’nature-centred’ environmental ethic, where humankind is not placed above or beyond the environment, but is embedded within it. We need to acknowledge and appreciate our internal relatedness with the nonhuman world, and how our actions affect ecosystems and the biosphere’s functioning. Ecocentrism cares less about individual animals or organisms, and more about the health and balance of ecological communities and ecosystems.
Deep ecology calls for an understanding of the ecological world and claims we that should have a deeper interaction and ecological consciousness with the ecosphere and its inhabitants. We only have a right to interfere with the nonhuman world to fulfil our vital needs and we need to alter our consumptive exploitative attitudes towards a new approach of self-fulfilment and self-realisation.
Is it ethically wrong to overexploit natural resources, pollute environmental habitats and eliminate endangered species?
If so, is it because the nonhuman natural world has an intrinsic value to exist and flourish in itself, or is it because if we destroy these resources, humans will not be able to benefit from their use, now and into the future?
Can we have a moral duty to organisms that cannot reciprocate this obligation, or ecosystems and nonliving things that have no agency?
Should our ethical behaviour towards the nonhuman world be grounded in an extension of ethical principles that we find in human moral theory or should they instead be formulated from some ’new’ type of environmental ethic?
Callicott, J. Baird, In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989).
Light, Andrew, and Rolston III, Holmes, Environmental Ethics: An Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003).
Naess, Arne, Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy, trans. by David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
Passmore, John, Man’s Responsibility For Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1974).
Stone, Christopher D., Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects (California: William Kaufmann, Inc., 1974).
Taylor, Paul, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989).
