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Centre Of Bioethical Research & Analysis (COBRA)

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

The precautionary principle proposes that when there is a lack of scientific proof about a potential harm to human health or the environment, we should act in a precautious manner until it can be proven that there are no risks, or at the very least, they are minimal, or ethically acceptable. It guides our actions through a preventive approach, rather than a reactionary approach, and claims that precautious actions now are better than tackling the costly and harmful effects of reacting once the environmental destruction or human health damage has already occurred. The principle has been used in a wide range of national, European, and international agendas, commission reports, and policy documents, both in the area of environmental protection and also within the area of bioethics and medical ethics.

Strong PP versus Weak PP

The strong precautionary principle claims that we should not take action unless we are certain that the action proposed will do no harm, but the weak precautionary principle is only implemented when there is a near certainty that that action will cause damage to human health or the environment. Both positions certainly have their difficulties. The weaker version requires an almost certainty that harm will ensue unless precaution is taken, while the strong version infers that we take precaution in all circumstances where there is the slightest possibility that it will cause harm. We are left with the options of near complete inaction, or allowing any action unless enough proof can be shown that it will definitely cause harm.

Criticisms

There are many different criticisms against the precautionary principle, here are six of the most important ones:

i. Vagueness

It cannot be effective as it will not give specific answers to specific problems and ethical cases. It will be inadequate within policies because it gives no clear specific guidance for regulatory recommendations.

ii. Incoherent

The principle impedes future possibilities even if the unfamiliar risks may turn out to be far less risk-prone, or yield greater benefits, than the risks being taken with the present familiar course of actions. No decision is ever going to be risk-free, so the precautionary principle is incoherent because the actions that it implements may prove to be of equal, or greater, risk than those they were set up to avoid.

iii. The Absolutist Criticism

It may lead policymakers to unnecessarily examine each and every risk despite their unlikely probability of happening. It has the potential to overlook the probabilities of risks for the mere fact that they are indeed risks, and therefore, should be minimised or prevented.

iv. Anti-Scientific

It is often seen as unscientific, impeding progress, and as a scaremongering concept slowing down modernity’s development. Some propose that it forces us into a course of action when scientific proof is unavailable, which is ultimately a poor form of science, ethics, and policy.

v. Uncertainty

In most circumstances we are never completely oblivious or ignorant to potential risks of a particular course of action, hence undermining the principle’s validity. It is said that we often have sufficient evidence to establish the most likely possible outcomes, in order to make an educated guess, instead of being trapped by the stagnant effects of inaction.

vi. Inaction

There are no upper limits placed on precautionary excess, which could lead to too much precaution and scaremongering among a population. Over-the-top precaution slows development, progress, ingenuity, and paralyses people into fear and over-cautiousness. In attempts to avoid risk; there is also the possibility of losing potential gains through inaction.