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The Role of Social Capital and Governance in Managing Common Pool Resources and Creating Rural Innovations in the Slovensky Raj National Park.

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**Introduction**

Social capital can be characterised according to the variety of different views or dimensions that have originated in the interdisciplinary character of this concept. Of this variety, three dimensions can be identified which are relevant to the approach in this study. The economic dimension is based on rational choice theory, which sees social capital as a set of norms and trust that enable actors to make effective market transactions and reduce their transactional costs. Sociology introduces social capital in relation to social ties or communities of association. According to Putnam (1997 *In: Sobel, 2002*) social capital is represented by civic association networks, and the norms and trust that facilitate cooperation and co-ordination for mutual benefit. Political scientists see social capital in a broader sense. Ostrom (2001 *in: Gatzweiler, 2002*) and Fukuyama (2000) stress the role of social capital in producing productivity, income opportunities or constraints in a subsequent time period as the result of repeated community interactions with multiple actors.1 Bourdieu (1985 *in: Sobel, 2002*) defines social capital as the aggregate of the actual or potential resources that are linked to the possession of a durable network of more-or-less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition. According to Fukuyama (2000), social capital is an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between individuals. Gatzweiler (2002) understands it as a precondition of societal well-being, the capacity to adapt or the ability to innovate. The concept as adopted in our study is based on a network definition of social capital and endorses the notion of social capital as the nature of relationships between people and the social networks that they form (Murray, 20042).

Generally, it is accepted that totalitarian regimes destroy social capital (Paldam and Svenson, 2000, and Putnam, 1993 *in: Chloupkova, 2003*) and that low social capital leads to a number of dysfunctions. It was also proven (Putnam, 1993 *in: Chloupkova, 2003*) that there is a correlation between the duration of a dictatorship and deformation of trust and cooperation. Examples from Latin American societies show that a narrow radius of trust produces a two-tiered moral system, which serves as a

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1 In contrast with the two-actor concept commonly applied in the Prisoner Dilemma Theory.
2 The theoretical basis for our analyses is expanded upon in this paper.
cultural foundation for corruption, often regarded as a legitimate way of looking after one’s family. One illustrative example from Europe is administrative centralisation, which in France has led to an excessively rigid and unresponsive political system. Low social capital has been identified among the major reasons for the inefficient local government of southern Italy (Banfield, 1958 and Putnam, 1993 in: Fukuyama, 2000). In contrast with western European countries, the regulatory processes of former command and control economies of central and eastern European countries (CEECs) can be characterised by closed, unidirectional decision-making, excluding all those who are not members of elite political structures, rejecting constructive criticism which might have indicated system change (Gatzweiler, 2002).

CEECs have undergone unprecedented political and economic changes since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and most of them have made considerable progress in the area of structural reforms. The former regime, however – represented by massive state interventions, state monopolies and absolute control over all actions – resulted in a dramatic decline of trust in formal rules and institutions, and an erosion of personal relationships as the political elite was established, resulting in interpersonal relations emerging as the only trustful institution left. The reconstruction of destroyed trust requires more time as was expected at the beginning of the transformation process and such time has not been available. Thus, in most post-communist countries, the formal ‘grey/black’ network has been converted into negative social capital, which is slowing the processes of democratisation and reform. In such a situation, the strategic interests and actions of various economic groupings – composed of the most adaptable individuals with access to resources, information and power (frequently the former communist elite) – influence political, institutional and economic change. In spite of such development, the accession of CEECs to the EU cannot be simply understood as a definite response as this politically-driven process has resulted in a more or less mechanical transposition of formal norms and rules without either sufficient change in the institutional environment or the evolution of new social capital capable of reconstruction or building endogenous societal rules and norms. Due to these factors, transition cannot be understood as a free evolution, since both democratisation in 1989 and EU integration in 2004 were driven externally.

The situation in the Slovak Republic has several specific features. Firstly, the Slovak Republic, historically a part of a larger political unit (Austro-Hungarian empire 1300-1918, Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1993), was generally underrepresented at both the
policy- and decision-making levels, and as such very seldom governed by its own representatives. Thus, in comparison with neighbouring countries that built their national or regional governance structures with their own human capacities, there is an evident lack of skills in governance and the formation of institutions in Slovakia, which results in the additional decline of social capital. Secondly, Slovaks are rural Roman-Catholics, with traditional, and anti-reformist behaviour, also having a strong sense of ‘false social equity’. The above-mentioned factors, add to the generally low social capacity in CEEC. It does apply also for informal cooperation which is hindered by low interpersonal trust and “grey/black” network.

The low social capital in post-socialist countries, the historical gap in the governance of the country and the traditional stereotype are predominant also in the institutional rules that apply to direct environmental governance. The Ministry of the Environment serves as a central body at the national level. Responsibilities in nature conservation stated under nature conservation law are executed by the State Nature Conservation agency, represented in each region by the administrations of national parks. These organisations serve as expert bodies and only have an advisory voice. The power of decision is spread multiply over the regional and local authorities – these are located outside of the national parks in the administrative centres in which the protected areas belong. Additionally, several legal provisions conflict with one another, especially those falling under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and particularly

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3 Prior to 1945, most public representatives including teachers, attorneys or public servants were from Hungary (up to 1918) or the Czech Republic (1918-1939).

4 Although the first wholesale and credit cooperative in continental Europe (Gazdovský spolok 1845), was founded in Slovakia, this was the individual activity of a few strong regional actors acting in defence against the upper classes and against the exploitation and competition inherent in capitalism. A more common form of rural partnership was that of land ownership, cooperative or semi-private ownership, finally destroyed by the nationalisation of all property in 1948.

5 This is understood as the state under which everybody shall be equally poor or rich irrespective of their personal capabilities and achievements.

6 Examples are taken from civic societies, which in the Slovak Republic are not necessarily representing real public interests. Very often interpersonal relations and individual interest dominates. Thus rather than enabling the evolution of informal rules and partnerships, several non-profit organisations represent the interests of elite groupings close to governmental structures and funds.

7 Prior to EU membership, such authorities were formed from district authorities, usually more than one per park. Harmonisation with the EU legislation introduced new administrative structures based on the NUTS classification and with a shift of competencies from former district offices to the elected authorities at NUTS III and NUTS IV level. It is too early to analyse the effect of decentralisation for the regions as the process initiated in 2002 is still not fully effective. Despite this, it is already possible to summarise that except for transparency or democracy, the effect on nature reserves will be minimal as the fragmentation of these areas remains a problem.
with respect to the management of forestry and agriculture. Citizens as individuals are not particularly active in environmental decision-making. There is a general lack of interest in public matters, and apathy towards involvement in community life. Current economic development is focused on material values and consumption hinders the public’s recognition of environmental protection as an important element of society. The reasons for this are numerous but two common features stand out, namely the absence of a mechanism for the efficient enforcement of management rules and control, and weak public participation. Such a complicated governance structure can be identified as a source of inefficiency in current governance and thus forms a key part of our analysis.

The research in this study is part of the 5th research framework project Integrated Development of Agricultural and Rural Institutions -IDARI, QLRT-2001-027189 namely IDARI WP3 research grouping: Social capital, Governance and Rural Innovations coordinated by the Humboldt University, Berlin. The assumption that totalitarian regimes in former socialist countries in CEE are responsible for lowering social capital, with enforced cooperation operating as the key determinant, is key to our approach. In addition that concept of trust and location within social network is crucial for the understanding of social processes in CEECs and change in formal institutions, in particular the legislation relating to property rights and market exchange, which has reverberated and affected the informal institutions, social relationships and associations that people constitute (Murray, 2005). The general objective of this research, which is further elaborated in section 2, is to analyse processes of cooperation with respect to exogenous and endogenous variables and their roles in the formation of social capital and the importance of formal and informal institutions, particularly as to how they interact within a multidimensional institutional environment.

This paper is divided into seven parts. The theoretical concept of social capital and the situation in reforming countries (and the model region itself) was described in the introduction. Section 2 provides a hypothesis and the objectives of the case study in relation to the whole research group as well as case characteristics specific to the

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9 For example, the Act on Nature Conservation declares the protection of nature as a fundamental priority within protected areas; however, the Act on Forests allows timber production within areas of nature conservation, even providing subsidies for activities in areas with extreme climatic conditions.

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case-study. Section 3 describes the model region and existing processes there, paying particular attention to the unit of analysis. Section 4 concerns the overall methodology and research process. Actor visualisation is considered in section 5. Section 6 analyses and interprets most of the empirical findings of the study and focuses on six crosscutting themes. The paper is concluded in section 7. Interview guidelines and a list of interviewees with additional background data are listed in annexes.

This paper is largely based on a background paper (Kluvánková and Zajíčková, 2004) as well as on the theoretical paper of Catherine Murray (2005). Analyses (particularly those in section 6) are constructed on the results of in-depth interviews conducted in a model region by Zdenka Zajickova, to whom the author would like to express her sincere gratitude.

2. Objective of the Case study and Case study Hypothesis

The research work carried out under the case study in the SRNAP microregion explores the evolution of processes in rural development connected with changes in social capital resulting from the transition from a command-and-control system (1990) and the EU integration (2004). The aim was to analyse the processes determining social capital evolution, depending on the actors’ adaptive capacity to undertake institutional innovations and to understand the success and failure of co-operative strategies. This research was aimed to fulfil the overall objective of the WP3 project Social Capital, Governance and Rural Institutional Innovations: how changes in social capital formation lead to institutional innovations in the rural context. In particular we concentrate on following research questions:

- How have changes in social capital influenced rural innovations and governance in agro-tourism in relation to the Slovenský Raj national park?
- How does state intervention influence social capital and rural innovations?

Institutional changes thus form the key drivers of our hypothesis, in particular how these are reflected in learning process and social capital formation, which determine rural innovations such as rural tourism. Cooperation and the learning process are understood as the key factors of trust. Therefore the behaviour of selected actors is analysed, taking into consideration two major drivers, namely transition and integration. Under the transition process, major issues to be analysed are the property rights regime, land fragmentation, and multiple decision-making conflicts.
Determinants studied within EU integration are the effects of EU membership on the rural context and trust building e.g. the positive and the negative aspects of decentralisation and their effects on direct democracy in rural communities, the perception of a ‘rural actors’ grouping and their understanding of an EU identity. We would expect these factors (drivers) to have a positive effect on both trust-building and social capital evolution in the target region, especially in the case of decentralisation. This could possibly lead to a bottom-up process of cooperation resulting in the mobilisation of internal forces in the region. The process of decentralisation – regarding new competences, experiences in self-governance and the political independence of regions – can be regarded as a stimulus for the application of the participatory approach in decision-making at the regional level. EU membership, especially adaptation to community institutional customs – can serve as a strong incentive for rural innovations and yield results in alternative approaches to common pool resources management; we expect this movement also in the target region of Spiš. We anticipate that the learning process concludes with the building of trust among involved stakeholders at the both formal and informal level. There is, however, the possibility of building mistrust, which might materialise due to a failure of cooperation, leading to a loss of stakeholders’ reputations or a lack of social capital development.

3. Presentation of the Region

3.1. Description of the region and the Slovensky Raj National Park

The region of Spiš has been selected for this study due to its historical, economic and cultural links to the protected area of the Slovenský Raj national park. The Spiš region is situated in north-eastern Slovakia, which is known for its important Gothic heritage, formed by the German mining community (since about 1300)\(^\text{10}\). Prior to the reform of the public administration, this region belonged to the district of Spišská Nová Ves; it is currently a part of the Košice NUTS III. The economic situation in the target region is not favourable due to regional disparities based on asymmetrical distribution of human resources and infrastructure and on geographical barriers (the area is mountainous). These characteristics render

\(^{10}\) There are monuments here listed under the UNESCO protection (Spišský castle – the largest medieval castle in Europe, Spišská Kapitula and the Roman-Gothic church in Žehra).
eastern parts of the country a periphery, unattractive for foreign investors, to export or to a qualified labour force. The asymmetrical allocations of educational and research capacities are also responsible for the lack of innovative activities in regional development here, as well as for the low productivity in the northern and eastern regions and the poor labour force mobility. Property regimes and nature conservation constitute important issues in region of Spiš. There is a growing interest in tourism in areas with high biodiversity as a source of income for the local population, as well as in the agro-tourism movement in the agricultural part of the region, some of which lies within the protected zone of the Slovenský Raj national park\footnote{See also Annex c.}

The Slovenský Raj (‘Slovak Paradise’) national park (SRNP) – with an area of 19,760 ha – was established as a protected area by law in 1964 and, in 1988, its status was changed to that of ‘national park’. The relief of the park comprises a compact eroded benchland with a plateau cut by deep canyons, waterfalls, and small rivers. The vegetation inversion typical for such conditions enables the existence of relict karstic forests of pine and spruce, which grow on cliffs and rocky escarpments. A total of 180 caves have been registered in the park. Due to its unique natural character, the Slovenský Raj is the only park in the Slovak Republic registered as a candidate for the Pan Parks\footnote{The major mission of the PanParks project initiated by WWW International is to promote synergy between nature conservation and local development through sustainable tourism in European protected areas. Five PanParks principles, covering environmental, social, economic and cultural aspects are a forming precondition for the certification of candidates to the network and this makes them eligible for network benefits such as marketing programmes, projects in rural tourism, presentation of good practice etc. see also \url{www.panpark.org}} European network of protected areas. SRNP is administratively positioned in the territories of both the Košice and Prešov regions (NUTS III). The majority of the parkland is, however, located within the Košice region, with Spišská Nova Ves serving as the regional centre, which influences economic and social relationships both in the park and in its surrounding municipalities.

One of the serious human impacts on the park is tourism, in particular visitors to the endangered aquatic systems and canyons of the northern part of the park, into which access is restricted by one-way tourist paths constructed of wooden and iron steps and ladders.\footnote{For example, in a most attractive valley, called Suchá Belá, tourism during the summer season reaches an average of 1025 visitors per day, with an hourly maximum sometimes exceeding 500} Other economic activities affecting the park territory and its buffer zone are
forestry and agriculture, with practices often conflicting against nature conservation law. The park is surrounded by several municipalities that exert their own impacts on the natural environment, especially through the dumping of waste or the illegal cutting of rare and endemic forest species for firewood by the Roma population located on the northern edge of the park.

3.2. Unit of analysis
This case study research focuses on the effects of ongoing institutional changes and the conflicts that emerge from the behaviour of actors forcing their own individual or group interests. Changes and reactions of these actors, at both individual and collective levels, and in the sense of cooperation or non-cooperation, were observed in this case study. Within this dynamic process, three major conflict areas in nature conservation can be identified, namely property rights and user interests; governance structure; and cooperation structure.

Property Rights and User Interests
Property rights represent the fundamental issue in nature conservation in the Slovak Republic. As documented in all former communist CEECs, common property was promoted against private property, which has resulted in common property being treated as open access, with all the inherent effects of this e.g. free-riding, overexploitation etc. The present ownership structure in the Slovak national parks is diverse, with almost 50% held in either private or community hands (47% in the case of the Slovenský Raj national park). An absence of appropriate incentives to encourage sustainable behaviour in such owners has resulted in the expansion of intensive economic activities, e.g. intensive tourism and the timber industry. The key question today revolves around who will control the local assets, either generating decent revenues in the long term (if managed in a sustainable way) or much greater short-term benefits based on natural resource exploitation?

visitors (internal park materials 2003). Such an enormous number of people without effective control on visitor numbers can seriously affect the natural values of the ecosystems

See also part 2.

The Act on Nature Conservation adopted in 1995 implemented compensation for removal of opportunities for income generation by private and municipal owners. The governmental order to administrate such a right came into force at the end of 2001 and the application process is very complex, not transparent and is lacking state support. By the end of 2002 only two owners were able to get compensations but none of them from SRNAP.
Governance Structure

Property rights – seen rather as individual characteristics – form part of property regimes, which also include rules of governance\textsuperscript{16}. Based on the historical evolution of governance (as described in the introduction), it is possible to state that the present governance structure in the Slovak national parks is complicated even in comparison with neighbouring transition countries. Firstly, park territory is held under the competence of numerous authorities and divided between even more administrative units. Such multiple decision-making structures reduce the flexibility of park management and have a significant effect on the coordination of responsibilities, resulting in various conflicting situations such as forest fires, overuse or even illegal activities in the parks. For example, in the SRNAP, the general territorial competences presiding over the park are shared by 15 municipalities and two regional governments; specific competences are held by several state organisations, such as the water management, fire and forest authorities. The Nature Conservation Administration lacks any legal power but is responsible for preserving biodiversity, and thus is heavily limited in carrying out its responsibilities. As a result, unique park territories have been seriously affected by fire and/or by uncontrolled numbers of visitors.

Cooperation structure

The development and implementation of rural policies and alternative economic programs is weak due to the widespread lack of communication and cooperation between key actors. Due to historical determinants mostly related to the previous regime and the multiple authority structure, partnership and trust among regional actors is so eroded and paralysed that even powerful policy incentives (financial or institutional) are not sufficient to motivate them to carry out joint actions. Two illustrative examples from the Slovenský Raj are the difficulties in implementing the Pan Parks certification and, more specifically, the ability of the park community to cooperate in the development and implementation of a Sustainable Tourism Development Strategy\textsuperscript{17}.

3.3. Stakeholders in the region

\textsuperscript{16} For more details see also section 6, c.
\textsuperscript{17} Under principle 4 of the PanPark strategy
The major concern of this section is to identify and describe the stakeholders involved in the ongoing processes of our study. The rationale for their selection is based on previous experience in the region, its historical context and the multiple interests of the stakeholders as introduced in section 4. The stakeholders in the region are as follows:

1. Landowners or users of agricultural land
Two types of representatives can be identified in this grouping. Firstly, those farmers in the territory with an interest in traditional agriculture practices, not interested in adopting alternative uses (non-adopters). Reasons for their interests are various, e.g. conservative attitude, favourable conditions for crop or animal production in the area, missing information or a lack of incentive to change. Secondly, those farmers that already have undertaken or declared their interests in change towards rural tourism (adopters). This grouping suffers from restrictions set down by the Nature Conservation Act, which – together with type of ownership\(^{18}\) - determines the type of preferred economic activity.

Owners of the forest also belong to this grouping (farmers, co-operatives, the state forestry organisations municipalities, [the city forestry /organisations, associations of private forest owners, individual owners) and will also be considered where their interests match with the purpose of our analysis (agro-tourism) in the target region.

2. Municipalities
This grouping is represented by the mayors of the 15 municipalities located around the park boundary, three of these located directly within the territory of the park itself. In addition to their historical roots and inhabitance of the space as a settlement area, their main link to the park consists of economic interests, e.g. tourism, timber, responsibilities for providing environmental infrastructure, and waste management. Several municipalities own the technical equipment (wooden and iron ladders and steps) necessary to enter the park. For this reason, municipalities play a strategic role as the only subjects practically controlling

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\(^{18}\) Which varies from cooperatives and individual owners to state-owned land
access to the park as well as having decision-making power on municipal issues. Cooperation in the field of rural development, however, is not yet widespread.

3. Self-government municipal networks
Two municipality associations serve as the specific actors here: these are the Microregion Slovenský Raj (‘Microregion’) and the Association of Municipalities of SRNAP (‘the Association’), which were established by municipalities (owners of technical equipment in the park) and have voluntary membership. Both are formed through bottom-up processes and are responsible for the maintenance of technical equipment in the park owned by their members. The Association – the first in the region with a yearly budget of approximately EUR 18,600, obtained through entrance fees (EUR 14,000 per year) and annual contributions from the members’ municipalities – concentrates mainly on carrying out it main responsibilities. Microregion, which is comparatively new to the region (2003), was established on the basis of partnerships and experience obtained during the transition process (1989-2003) and, in contrast with the Association, has declared its ambitions to extend its activities from its original responsibilities (technical equipment maintenance) to cooperation in the provision of tourism services.

4. Regional government
Regional government (NUTS III) was established by the Act on Regional Administrative Reform (passed in 2001) and – according to EU regional policy – in order to decentralise power. As mentioned above, the territory of the park is divided between two regions (Košice and Prešov). The core zone of our interest in SRNAP, however, is concentrated in the area under the responsibility of the Košice NUTS III region; as such, we decided to limit our analyses to the regional government of Košice. The regional government received major responsibilities in regional development, environmental protection as well as social policies. Although reform is not yet complete\(^\text{19}\), it is evident that regional government will play a crucial role in regional planning and decision-making.

\(^{19}\)Financial decentralisation effective from 2005 will for the first time in the history of the country decentralise the collection of income tax; 70% will remain at regional level, 23% at municipal level and only 7 % will be allocated at the central level.
5. State agriculture authority
The state agriculture authority (the Chamber of Agriculture) represents farmers in the region. Its major responsibilities are to maintain and execute activities in the agricultural sector with a regulatory approach to agricultural units.

6. Park administration
The administration of the Slovenský Raj national park, with its limited competences in nature conservation, serves as the state expert body for the management of protected areas. The park administration has both financial and human resources problems, which ultimately affect its responsibilities in the complicated territorial division described above. Despite the prevailing conservative attitude of the park, agro-tourism as a dynamic means of addressing nature conservation issues has been agreed on. One example can be seen in their initiative to certify SRNAP within the Pan Parks network.

7. Tourism
Tourism networks are composed of regional tourism agencies located in the region interested in providing information and expertise in rural tourism (for individual enterprises or municipalities). The grouping is composed of two kinds of actors involved in tourism. The first of these are agencies established by formal processes, represented by the regional development agency in Spišská Nová Ves. The second grouping comprises voluntary commercial tourism agencies, tour operators for bed and breakfast facilities or individual clients both operating exclusively within the target region of Spiš.

8. Non-profit
Non-profit organisations in the target region are organisations with a particular interest in environmental protection or social exclusion issues. We will concentrate on: NGOs concerned with the environment of the Slovenský Raj national park; and community centres or associations dealing with the inclusion of the Roma minority established in bottom-up processes, which serve as examples

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20 The administration does not have legal powers, see also introduction
of the positive evolution of the community non-profit movement operating in the field of rural development.

4. Methodology and Analytical Framework

The methodology used in our case study is derived from the overall theoretical concept of social capital and the case-study approach adopted in the background paper: “Social Capital and Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe – A Theoretical Perspective” (Murray, 2005) and the research hypothesis that low social capital in new democracies of CEECs hinders cooperation between actors.

Further attention is paid to the measurement of social capital. According to various authors it has not yet been satisfactorily described (Paldam 2000, Svendsen 2003, Chloupkova 2003). Generally, two broad approaches are used. The first of these (Putnam 1993) uses census data of grouping membership in a given society, and the second is based on a survey on levels of trust and civic engagement. The latter have been regarded as an essential correlation between social capital and trust, particularly for relationships within rural communities. The institutional environment is defined as a set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that establish the basis for production, exchange and distribution (North, 1971 in: Sobel, 2002) or characterise the environment, specifying the rules of the game or strategy, which also serves to coordinate beliefs and select equilibrium. Thus, values and uses of social capital depend on the institutional environment (Sobel, 2002). Based on the theoretical assumptions described above, our case study will analyse the evolution of trust and cooperation in rural socio-ecological systems (Figure 1) particularly the formal and informal institutional environments along two major drivers of change: the transition process and membership of the EU.

For the purposes of this study, stakeholders are understood as any individual, any grouping of individuals or any organisation having certain interests, positions, responsibilities or who are in any way involved in the life of the community via resource regimes or other interests. The stakeholders in our case introduced in section three are diverse. For the purpose of our analyses we therefore concentrated on key representatives i.e. actors playing certain roles in ongoing rural processes.

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21 The measurement of trust in the business sector is specific: one relatively common method is carried out by looking at changes in market valuations of a company before and after takeover bids.
22 See also section 2.
Selection of actors for our analyses was based on previous experience and knowledge from SRNAP and a selection procedure based on the impact/importance approach, where impact is determined as the effect that stakeholder behaviour can have over the community and rural innovations such as agrotourism, and importance as the dependence of stakeholders on the governance structures of the community. In our case, stakeholders with at least a medium effect or impact were identified as actors. Actors involved come from different fields, and respect a multiple actors setting as described in section 3. The list of those actors interviewed is also attached as an annex to this report. The process of grouping these actors and their visual representation is in section 5.

Data collection was a two-fold process incorporating both primary and secondary data.

Secondary data collection: (regional statistics, EU documents, Natura 2000, public governance reform, EU funds, etc.): July 2004-June 2005. The data obtained serves as background information for a description of the statement of problems, actors and their relations essential for social capital evolution etc.

Primary data collection: Based on the Guidelines for Interview developed in the IDARI team early spring 2005. In-depth interviews were conducted in the period of May-July 2005. The final interview scheme adopted for the purpose of our case-study is annexed to this paper. Together 28 actors were approached; of these, two refusals were given\(^2\) and 26 interviews completed. The average length of interview varied from 30 to 90 minutes.

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\(^2\) Tourism info centre and agriculture cooperative
Figure 1: Institutions and Cooperation in socio-ecological systems of SRNAP.

**INSTITUTIONS**: formal vs. informal

- **Informal institutions**
  - traditions, norms etc.

- **Formal institutions**
  - rules, laws, act etc.

drivers of institutional change

**TRANSITION**
- split of C-SFR – new property regimes, land fragmentation, liberalisation

**EU MEMBERSHIP**
- Decentralisation, policies reform, participatory governance

**Process of learning and trust**

**Actors**
- Agri authority
- Regional Government
- Park Administration
- Tourism network
- Municipalities
- Farmers
- Non-profit
- Municipal network
- Agriculture network

**Clusters**: rural actors, authorities, networks,

**Non co-operation ↔ Co-operation**
5. Visual Presentation of Actors

The process of selecting actors as described in section 4 continues here in the determination of their role in the cooperative process. According to certain basic attributes – determined in institutional analysis – actors were clustered into the following three groupings: the ‘authorities’; the ‘rural actors’; and the ‘networks’. The groupings integrate each actor’s attributes, their level of cooperation and the interaction of formal and informal institutions. A visual representation of the actors and the rationale for their allocation to a particular cluster is displayed in Figure 1.2.

5.1. The ‘Authorities’

The ‘authorities’ cluster is composed of organisations with formal responsibilities in a specific field of expertise. Their cooperation relates to their exercise of these responsibilities by means of formalised institutions. None of them is economically active in the regions. The cluster comprises the state agriculture authority, the park administration and the regional government.

The state agriculture authority is an organisation established by the state to coordinate, inform and support the implementation of state agricultural policies. Agro-tourism is seen as a chance for the region under the conditions of simultaneously being able to develop infrastructure and services. Due to the cross-over of responsibilities with the Ministry of the Environment and several controversial provisions in the legal setting as described in introduction, the state agriculture authority has an antagonistic relationship with the park administration and several of the non-profit actors. Relationships with other actors are regarded as rather neutral.

The regional government (NUTS III) in the region is represented by the Spišská Nová Ves department, the competencies of which are described in section 3.3. As this body is rather new in the regional executive, analysis of the impacts of its activities in the region is not yet possible. For the same reason, the organisation suffers from a lack of professional skills to undertake its responsibilities in regional planning and nature conservation. In spite of this, a strong degree of interest was clearly expressed in rural development, with a particular leaning towards tourism. As far as agro-tourism is
concerned, it was suggested that a more systematic approach is a precondition for successful implementation in the region.

The park administration as described in sections 3.2 and 3.3 holds a very delicate position in this grouping. Its competences are very clearly spelt out in a framework of unclear rights and governance rules. Due to this position, the park administration suffers from a relatively poor reputation in the region. Its initiative to certify the park under the Pan Parks scheme is unique and goes beyond both its formal responsibilities and standard practice in other Slovak national parks. Such an initiative is based on the personal attitudes of key representatives in the administration, who employ numerous informal institutions to undertake this task. Examples of this are informal consultations, joint activities with tourism networks and the administration’s membership (as an observer) in the Microregion network and it is possible to state that the park administration partly acts as a rural actor.

5.2. ‘Rural Actors’

The ‘rural actors’ cluster is characterised by rural interests e.g. economic, environmental and social etc. as well as a considerable degree of involvement in the policy and decision-making process of the SRNAP community. Their level of cooperation varies and is based on both formal and informal rules. They are chiefly represented by farmers and non-profit organisations. Municipalities – which also constitute the local authorities – were incorporated into this cluster since they operate with the same attributes.

The grouping of farmers is relatively diverse with respect to orientation and type of activity but the farmers tend to be rather passive in terms cooperation outside of their grouping. More dynamics are associated with those farmers intending to adopt rural innovations, e.g. agrotourism, as these began to form agro-tourism associations, of which some of them are founder members. They also declared an interest to cooperate with the tourism network. One farmer from our sample has a mixed activity, applying both traditional farming and agro-tourism practices.

24 Very often perceived as representing a barrier to economical development in the region and further elaborated on in part 6 of this report.
25 See also section 3.3.
The position of municipalities varies according to size, economic and social situation as well as their location within the region. The most powerful among them are linked to Spišská Nova Ves – the regional centre – and/or with direct access to the park. Altogether, seven municipalities from a total of 15 were identified as key actors for the purposes of our analyses. Their dynamics are derived from their ownership of the footpath system as described in section 3.3, as well as from their political responsibilities and the interests of local elected representatives. Specific responsibilities of municipalities with regards to the footpath system initiated the formation of a new organisation operated as a self-government network which is described below.

Non-profit organisations are characterised by their specific interests according to their status. Groupings of environmental NGOs, represented by two organisations, act in a support role to the activities of the park administration. Focus of community centres is very specific, in their interests for Romas inclusion, despite they are well know for diversity of informal mechanism in place.

5.3. Networks
The final cluster is that of the ‘networks’, which are voluntary groupings of individual or collective actors with rural interests, whose actions are based on informal rules. Their voluntary character and rural interests determine their relatively dynamic activities in the region. The process of institutionalisation of some informal rules into the practice or formalised rules of their operation, e.g. access to information, mechanisms of conflict resolution, costs sharing, etc., is specific to this grouping. Two actual networks represent this cluster: the tourism network and the self-government municipal network.

The self-government municipal network (as described in section 3.3) is based on municipal activities and represented by two actors: the ‘Association’ and ‘Microregion’. The latter of the two is a younger organisation and more dynamic in its activities. It was set up partly owing to a certain degree of dissatisfaction amongst particular municipalities as previous members of the Association. In contrast the Association’s interests lay mainly in its original competences e.g. the maintenance and upkeep of pathways in the park; these activities are the heritage of the former regime’s tourism agency. Membership in networks is voluntary. At present,
membership within networks is quite fuzzy, since several member municipalities have dual membership. These two networks are effectively rivals. These networks, however, represent the first informal partnerships and cooperative processes in the region.

The tourism network is of a different character due to its very specialised interests i.e. tourism. The grouping is mixed with respect to the type of actions concerned. The Regional Development Agency represents state interests while the Civic Associations for agro-tourism development are new actors and support the adoption of agro-tourism in the region. In between these extremes, two actors – the farmers and the rural tourism associations - represent the specific interests of members within the grouping. Their relation to most of the actors is co-operative or neutral.

Figure 2. Process of Actors Clustering
6. Determinants, Effects and Processes of Cooperation and Social Capital Formation

This section concentrates on the empirical findings of the whole case study. Framed within the theoretical construct of social capital and cooperation\(^{26}\), our study focuses on the integration of different institutional levels within the rural sector e.g. how formal and informal institutions interact and co-evolve. Analyses concern the major implications of institutional changes formulated in the case study objectives\(^{27}\). The concepts of learning, trust and communication between interacting groups of individuals is explored in different settings. Special attention is paid to the analysis of agro-tourism relative to rural development as a toll for the improvement of quality of life and the environment. This section is organised in six blocks following the major crosscutting themes identified by the overall methodology of the IDARI WP3 research group.

a. The Role of Trust/Mistrust and Opportunism (Social and Institutional)

This section deals with the exploration of levels of interpersonal and formal trust. Trust arises between stakeholders owing to positive previous interactions and experiences. On this basis, the notion of trust is developed through the learning process. In our study, actors declared a general trust between particular actors, especially within one grouping and based on interpersonal attitudes and relations between individuals. Thus, it is possible to say that their trust is based on interpersonal relations.

The degree of trust vested in authorities was considered generally to be high, although it is often influenced by interpersonal relations. One specific attitude noted with respect to the park administration is that it is considered as a less trustful organization\(^{28}\). This may be interpreted as evidence of a state failure in designing appropriate rural policies and governance structures for common pool resources, often associated with the protection of the environment being regarded as a barrier to

\(^{26}\) In reference to the project’s theoretical construction, briefly introduced in the introduction.

\(^{27}\) See section 2.

\(^{28}\) The same mistrust existed to NGOs whose main concern is environmental protection.
economic development (for example by municipalities, farmers, and tourism networks). The problem of governance structure as introduced in section 3.2 is key to this report and is further elaborated on in parts c, d and f of this section.

The post-socialist governance structure and unfavourable economic situation in the region determine a relatively pessimistic attitude of actors towards each other compared to the socialist times. Most actors judge the present situation as a negative change as far as interpersonal relations and behaviour are concerned. Reasons for this were indicated as being the overall economic depression, the negative effect of structural changes, namely the loss of social security and income, weak rural policies, increasing individualism between people, opportunism, isolation, and unclear property rights. On the other hand, actors were reticent to discuss problems in more detail or admit the existence of a conflict, or possible areas of conflicts, amongst themselves and their interests. An explanation for such an approach goes back to the issue of governance structure. At present, decision-making allows the development of power games, in which individual interests prevail over the public: actors often behave strategically in order to put themselves in more powerful positions with good information and control over ongoing processes. On the contrary, those whose positions are not strong enough can be characterised by a loss of interest, apathy or even opportunism.

The level of trust in regional government is difficult to judge since this was only recently established under the decentralisation reform of public administration and EU membership.

The attitude towards the Roma community is specific. Here, low trust generally prevailed depending on the historical context and/or importance of the problem to the actor and the community and is reciprocal. Based on other studies – as well as our own research in this field (2004) – it is possible to say that such an approach originates in cultural differences and the social exclusion of the Roma where the state plays critical role. Due to its specific character, the complex Roma issue is considered in a separate report.

In considering the mechanism for problem-solving within a grouping, half of the actors declared that they would first contact the individual who they thought was causing the problem; the other half would initialise a meeting of the entire grouping.

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29 Except for three, and one that did not know
30 Kluvankova at all, 2004.
Generally, we can summarize from this that actors do not expect solution of problems to come from outside and also that the existence of a regional or local leader has not been observed. Based on these findings, we can assume that the mechanism for solving conflicts within a grouping of actors in this case study is rather informal and that methods are case-specific. Just two actors (the regional government and the state agriculture authority) have declared that they have a formal mechanism for solving conflicts, but we can conclude that the specific character of their agenda is relevant, rather than their previous experiences with conflict mediation. According to our understanding, in principle, there is neither a formalised nor some informal mechanism for conflict resolution. To a large extent this originates in the specific governance structure as described in the introduction and section 3.

To sum up, trust based on interpersonal relations dominates. This is not trust of the organisation as a whole; it is trust of known representatives. The state plays a central role in the issue of trust, although in this case, it is only perceived in a negative sense due to inefficiency in the prevailing governance. However, behaviour of newly established actors shows openness to discussion and formalisation of modern institutional components into their rules of operation.

b. The Role of Communication and Learning

Communication and its structures in the face of cooperation in the region are key to this section. As stated in section 3.2, the lack of communication and cooperation and the low degree of trust among key actors hinder innovations in rural policies. Generally, it is possible to say that questions related to sources of information were partly ignored by actors as almost all actors declared that they have enough information (78% of actors) – in a real world situation, this would hardly seem realistic. This is related to our assumption that instead of a final product, primary information is still considered as being most valuable. This shows that some information might not be accessible and this can strategically reduce the attractiveness of the actor in the community life.

More specifically, formal sources e.g. TV, radio and newspapers etc. were identified by the majority of actors as their principal source of information. The use of the

31 Except for two ‘network’ representatives, one non-profit organisation and the national park administration.
Internet as a source of information was comparable to formal sources and can be seen as a positive effect of interregional communication. The type of information passed and received varies from general news, ongoing or prepared project initiatives, training and financial opportunities or very specific trade or production methods or processes, as well as various legal provisions e.g. EU, municipal or national legislation and its amendments.

Questions related to the possibility of blockage in the sharing of information between actors was ignored as well. Some actors argued that they are not able to evaluate this, or that these problems originate from the previous undemocratic period when information was not handled openly and relates to an assumption of value driven information. The same applies if we consider the possibility of withholding information by some actors within a grouping. However, most of the actors did not declare the existence of some difficulties relating to communication between particular actors and within a grouping; others declared difficulties based on mistrust, misunderstanding, passivity, disability of active listening, but again linked to interpersonal relations and not to a whole organisation.

In taking the frequency of meetings as a parameter of cooperation, it was observed that this varied within a grouping and is demand-based in most cases and very specific for each interest grouping. In each case, however, the frequency is at least four times per year on average.

In our view, the perception of information and a certain reservation observed in our study originates in the prevailing post socialist attitude to information as a value, and also to the fact that transfer of information into knowledge is still lacking. Opportunism that occurs amongst some actors is related to individual characteristics of particular actors, or personal experiences, or it is based on historical determinants that are expanded on in previous sections of this paper. It is not possible to identify a single leader with central power regarding the information process because of multiple actors, but municipal networks - as a result of evolutionary cooperative processes - are creating a platform for information exchange and knowledge transfer, the influence of which may increase in the near future. Based on the assumption and processes described above, we may emphasise that the unidirectorial and closed system with a limited exchange of information has its roots in the former communist period, and this is slowly opening. The intense information exchange enhances cooperative processes and the learning process amongst particular actors. The most
visible evidence of this can be observed within grouping networks, where the character and intensity of information exchange is rapidly growing. Further dynamics of this grouping may generate additional expansion and thus increase the potential of the community to facilitate self-organisation and governance.

c. The Role of Transaction Costs and Governance Structures in Cooperation

It is generally accepted that transaction costs play a crucial role in the organisation of economic activity. The most relevant of these in our case is the relation to the type of governance. Based on the works of various authors (Bromley 1991, Williamson 1979, 1996, 1985, Ostrom 1999, Honor 1961, Vatn 2005 and others), as well as on the exploration of the topic in various parts of this paper, we can say that transaction costs are a function of property regimes\(^\text{32}\) rather than just simple ownership structure (Vatn 2005).

The ownership regime in our study is not, however, easy to determine. As described in section 3, almost half of the parkland is in private and communal hands, the ownership types varying from pure private to common pool or semi-common pool and state ownership (Ostrom 1999). The lack of an appropriate institutional arrangement\(^\text{33}\), as identified in sections 3 and 4, may lead to a shift of costs to a third agent and to a large extent introduce an open access regime which may have tragic consequences in the overuse or unregulated management of natural resources and biodiversity values.

Another assumption used in our approach is that cooperation can be a strategy to reduce transaction costs by, for example, establishing the most efficient governance structure (Williamson 1996, 1985). Thus, trust can have a strong influence on cooperation and the level of transaction costs.

As for market costs, more details are provided in section f below, but generally it can be concluded that a weakly established governance structure\(^\text{34}\) creates various barriers to market development. Further evidence was exhibited in our analyses where questions related to the costs of meetings and extra costs born by building cooperation were not taken into account or were underestimated by almost all actors. The costs of

\(^{32}\) Understood as functions of two elements: the use and transfer of ownership and user rights and rules that govern transactions (Vatn 2005).

\(^{33}\) Due to poorly established formal rules to govern resources in protected areas

\(^{34}\) e.g. property regimes and multiple authorities
time lost or labour compensation are not representative as such a category is still largely underestimated. This is due to imperfect market and the over-supply of labour. However, it is possible to establish that such a cost born by state actors or actors founded in the former socialist regime are higher than those whose organizational structures and rules were set up under the present regime. This reflects back to the statement that governance structure is still heavily affected by the inefficient regime of socialism and a country-specific historical context\textsuperscript{35}. Such new structures, e.g. the ‘network’ cluster, on the other hand, represent the only positive examples where cooperation can reduce transaction costs. We are not able to provide evidence of this, however, due to incomplete information from the in-depth interviews.

Coming to non-market costs, professional membership and civil engagement areas are still heavily affected by times of state control over all level of governance and obligatory participation on state propaganda. Trust in such formalised networks is still questionable and thus assessing the benefits of being a member is problematic. Firstly, there are still a considerable number of actors who prefer opportunism and behave as free-riders (not being a members) or, on the contrary, membership is understood rather as an obligatory step towards achieving a formal reputation. Results of any pool shall be taken with certain reservation. In our in-depth interviews, actors positively evaluated their membership in regional and local groupings or associations as representing a benefit for their activities. They especially appreciated the possibilities for cooperation, discussion, the realisation of common projects, representation of particular actors within a grouping, and information dissemination. Only two representatives, both from municipalities, declared an eventual loss (or costs) of membership in the case of non-realised projects; as well as this, the membership fee was assessed as a loss in the case of formal membership.

Based on actors’ perceptions, the most significant aspects affecting willingness for cooperation are economic incentives, historical relationships and interpersonal relations. Actors undervalued the importance of geographical distance which has a particularly significant effect in the Slovensky Raj; the same applies for education and membership in the group or association.

Building on our incomplete findings, we can conclude that cooperation structure is dominated by individual interests and is not understood as a vital part of governance\textsuperscript{35} See also introduction
and reduction of transaction costs. This is partly due to the prevailing underestimation of the role of membership as a formal category, which is important in quantity not a quality of services that membership can provide for the benefit of the members. Formalised networks and communication rules are generally underestimated also due to the fact that mechanisms for the management of such communication are rare and their benefits are not developed to the satisfaction of all members. Thus many actors do not benefit from membership. Secondly, we see that institutional rules for the regulation of cooperation and efficient governance structure are weak or missing and open-access regime is becoming dominant in the region. Thus the level of general trust in formalised rules lags behind the degree of interpersonal trust, which is less preventive against the individual interests of powerful actors. These still dominate over the community interests.

d. The Role of the State – National, Regional and EU laws – and the Formal Institutional Environment in Cooperation

In this section, we analyse the formal institutional environment of the cooperation process with regards to the historical context that has formed actors’ experiences, attitudes and incentives. The analysis was conducted on the national, local and supranational (EU) level. At the national level, several critical opinions were expressed. Most of the actors declared a degree of reservation in trusting the park administration, which, despite limited competences, is perceived as the state representative for nature conservation in the park. Some NGOs went beyond this, and pointed to the deficiency of the state in designing public policies for nature conservation or the social inclusion of the Roma community.

The issue of low trust in the state dominates our study. The role of the park administration, however, is not central to the case. The governance structure currently in place, which may be characterised by a lack of an appropriate institutional regime for common pool resources of the protected areas and fuzzy rules for the

\[36\] For more details see sections 3.2 and 3.3.
\[37\] A critical example of this can be compensation for removal of opportunities for income generation by private and municipal owners, which are institutionally weakly defined and not kept up to date. Missing data relating to zoning of the parkland causes both confusion and inconsistency to all bodies involved etc. – see also section 3.2
governance\textsuperscript{38}, has resulted in the inefficient use of resources and the treatment of common property as though it were open-access. Using experience from our previous studies, and the analyses in this paper also documented by the actors themselves, it is possible to object that it is failure of the state to create adequate institutional support for rural development regarding nature protection. The consequences to the well being of the community are tremendous, and some are further elaborated in this report\textsuperscript{39}.

A similar situation was observed at the local level. In comparison to the period before 1989, only 44\% of actors declared that their trust in local government has increased. Facing a situation with a strong position of interpersonal trust, a higher level of optimism was observed with respect to the agenda and the influence of national governance when compared to the supranational level i.e. the EU. This is manifested in the reservation of actors to the effect of EU membership\textsuperscript{40}. Due to the above factors, we may conclude that the role of the EU on the well being of the community and community life is preliminarily to evaluate prior to any direct effects arising from positive experiences of actors. To sum up, it is possible to generalise that a low degree of trust in certain formal institutions (governance) and high expectations of the decentralisation process determine the increasing reputation of the local representatives.

e. The Role of Communities, Social Networks and Informal Institutions in Cooperation

Informal rules and voluntary participation are generally understood as the predominant conditions for successful cooperation. Thus the role of membership, community activities or community identity will be assessed in this session. Regarding the membership of regional groups or associations, actors declared their affiliation to at least one of these\textsuperscript{41}. Their willingness to contribute to community projects with either their time or money serves as further evidence that interest in community life is growing, although as stated in the interview guidelines, such a

\textsuperscript{38} Multiple authority; conflicting competences of forest and nature conservation authorities see sections 3 and 5

\textsuperscript{39} The effect on trust is described in section a, in relation to transaction costs in section c, and in relation to markets in session f

\textsuperscript{40} See also chapter 6 a

\textsuperscript{41} The park administration occupies a special position, in that as a state organisation it has limited rights for voluntary actions but still serves as an observer in self-government municipal networks.
contribution would not be accompanied with private benefits for individual donors. Such behaviour was observed for the majority of actors, except in ‘the Association’ self-governance municipal network. Similar findings were observed for collective problem solving, although this was more case-specific and responses were not so homogeneous.

Three groupings were identified based on a ranking of relative importance of the factors affecting cooperation. These were as follows:

- previous experience within the grouping, motivation, and interpersonal trust were considered as most important;
- collective trust, good communication and information were considered as having medium importance; and
- involvement of the state and local government and market incentives was considered as having lowest importance.

We identified a strong sense for community identity in the region, particularly from the fact that actors perceive the national park as central to the identity of their communities and of the Spiš region. The motives for this varied from their historical relation to the land of their ancestors to the traditions of Spiš area and its famous gothic culture to their identity relating to the market oriented incentives of tourism opportunities. Finally, it is possible to conclude that informal motives are equally important for cooperation, and are also underlined by empirical findings e.g. the high willingness for collective problem-solving or the individual contribution to community activity. Among factors essential for cooperation, the most relevant were found to be previous experience with group members, motivation, and interpersonal trust.

f. The Role of the Market and Competition in Fostering/Hindering Cooperation

Although market relations do not play a fundamental role in the management of protected areas and have not been a major focus of our analyses, we attempted to describe the ongoing evolution of the rural market in agro-tourism in the national park as a product of the local economy.

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42 See also f
All actors declared understanding the basic principles of the agro-tourism concept. However, their views differed significantly and very often the idea was simplified; most of them perceive this concept as a link between human activities and nature or the rural environment, regional development, and tourism activities as accommodation or additional services such as horse-riding, handicrafts, camping, etc. Very often, the concept of agro-tourism was misunderstood also by key actors (the tourism networks, the farmers or the state authorities). For example, the state agriculture authority and the farmers expressed their view that agro-tourism serves only as a kind of illusion, which does not solve the whole economy of the region and problems related to its infrastructure. Paradoxically, only the national park administration (SRNAP) showed an understanding of the agro-tourism concept as a double dividend, which can positively impact both the rural economy and the environment, offering the Pan Parks scheme. Additionally, several actors declared that agro-tourism could have been a realistic possibility also under the former socialist regime (one self-government municipal network, the national park administration, the state agriculture authority, etc.). We assume such a finding is biased by the fact that representatives of relevant organisations used to form a part of the former ‘flagship’ organisations established and maintained by the regime, which declared the well-being of socialism e.g. a kind of continuator of the previous state tourism agency) so their perception of the possibilities in the former socialist regime are far from reality.

In the case of the national park administration, this is related to the existence of the park also under the previous regime and their competencies in environmental protection.

Thus it is possible to say that the concept of agro tourism has not been taken seriously so far by the majority of actors and that short-term policies and actions based on the exploitation of natural resources and mass tourism still dominate across the region. One illustrative example of this can be seen in the plan for the construction of a golf course in a buffer zone of the park, in anticipation of the park increasing the attractiveness of this tourism product. On the other hand, income from additional services provided to players form the basis of the rural actors’ expectations. However, in rural areas with poor infrastructure, such sources of income frequently bypass the local population and are diverted directly to large investors, which are sufficiently

43 See also section 3 and www.panparks.org
44 See also chapters 3, 5, and 6 a, c
reputable to provide all-inclusive services to the discerning customers of such a development. In this case, the evidence can be supported by the experiences of two other national parks in Slovakia, namely the High Tatras and Low Tatras national parks.

The question of whether to support for agro-tourism or traditional farming provides further evidence of this. In our sample, actors’ responses were balanced, although conditions for traditional farming depend on both climatic conditions and subsidies, which are being drastically reduced across the region. Generally, the region’s economic situation as described in section 3 is not favourable. This is highlighted in our analyses by the responses of various actors. The most significant problems highlighted by our analysis are as follows: unemployment, inefficient infrastructure, economic and social problems. On the contrary, nature conservation was under-valued. Due to the above factors, agro-tourism activities are perceived as complementary services, rather than a challenge for community well being. Such a reservation can be interpreted according to various factors.

Firstly, decentralisation of governance from national to regional authorities is still an ongoing process and the space needed to create an adequate environment for the expansion of individual or community actions has not yet been created at the regional level.

Secondly, the national government has not been supportive in providing adequate instruments for rural policies in protected areas. Based on our previous studies and analyses in this paper, there is a lack of a comprehensive rural strategy and the individual interests of a few dominant actors are likely to grow. In addition, most actors are aware of the fact that a lacking infrastructure cannot be constructed without massive state subsidies, although they see tourism as the possible solution for regional problems.

Furthermore, this kind of reservation originates in the traditional attitudes that prevail across the region. For example, most of the existing agro-tourism activities (bed and breakfast, horse riding, camping etc.) are just transfers of ‘innovations’ from either abroad or elsewhere in Slovakia and, as such, are not truly ‘innovative’. This is a

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45 Including social exclusion of Romas which is understood as serious barrier for economic performance, rural tourisms or social cohesion.
46 Related to the failure of the state to create an appropriate institutional regime for common resources of the protected areas in the region and its ineffective governance over state land. See sections 3, 5 and 6d.
problematic issues, and we see that such transfers of activities are purely mechanical, and incorporate little consideration of the complex criteria for rural planning, profitability and risk analyses. The expectations of actors are still based on rather simple assumptions such as success in a neighbouring region, without taking into account site-specific conditions and the external effects of over-supply. In-depth interviews disclosed that many actors were not able to assess the competitiveness of their activities on the market, and that the role of active marketing was generally underestimated, despite the fact that the national park was perceived as a strong feature of their identity in both communities and the Spiš region\textsuperscript{47}. Exceptions to this were found in the national park administration, which emphasized the importance of the out-of-park investments and activities aimed at introducing controlled access to the park and to attract visitors by the cultural landscape outside park territory. Some farmers also underlined the importance of investments in other alternative activities such as ecological practices, biomass production or a combination of traditional farming and agro-tourism.

Despite several contrasting features such as a high degree of community identity or a positive opinion on the concept of agro-tourism, which was observed in research process, the national park is not understood as a product of regional economy but rather as an economic barrier to the execution of private or common property rights and rural policies. Thus the effect of the market on cooperation cannot be adequately measured. Based on our findings, it is possible to say that the absence of appropriate formal institutions to manage a variety of resource types hinder cooperation and market development in the region. Informal institutions that are in place such as the historical ownership structure\textsuperscript{48}, a high degree of interpersonal trust and community identity are not sufficient to fill this gap. Among the reasons for this, the most relevant are overestimation of the role of authorities, a weak information exchange and a lack of a learning process, as well as low social capital and a lack of financial resources.

The initiative of SRNAP to introduce the Pan Parks scheme serves as a good example, offering sufficient economic incentive and marketing instruments to support the local economy via biodiversity values in the park and thus promoting synergy between

\textsuperscript{47} The existence of the park was supported by the local community also in our previous studies conducted in SRNAP between 2002-3.

\textsuperscript{48} Collective ownership of forested or agricultural land
nature conservation and local development through sustainable tourism. The weak cooperation structure in the region described in section 3.2 can be identified as a major barrier for implementing this incentive scheme.

7. Conclusion

The governance structure in place is still traumatised by post socialist relations, particularly an inefficient institutional regime for the common pool resources and fuzzy rules for governance that were expanded upon in various parts of this study e.g. 1, 3 and 6. Such conditions have resulted in inefficient use of resources and treating common property as open-access. In addition to specific historical and cultural determinants of the governance in the CEEC and the Slovak Republic, low social capital may be considered a crucial aspect of the current development situation.

Trust observed in our case study was relatively high, but was still dominated by interpersonal relations. Formalised networks and communication rules are generally underestimated due to the fact that mechanisms for the management of such communication are rarely developed and the benefits of them not extended to the satisfaction of all members e.g. a conflict resolution strategy. Thus the level of general trust in formalised rules lags behind interpersonal trust, which is less preventive against the individual interest of powerful actors. These still dominate over the interests of the community.

It was also proven that particularly in cluster ‘Authorities’, the state plays the central role in the issue of trust, although this is perceived in a negative sense due to inefficiencies in the current governance. Even the active cooperative behaviour of the administration of the national park cannot overcome this inefficient governance structure as it is mostly based on the personal initiatives of individual representatives rather than on a formal position of the authority.

The communication structures - heavily affected by authoritative relationships as described in section 3.2 - proved to be dominant in reducing the learning capacity of the community. For example, our study observed that information is seen as a value in itself rather than as a source of knowledge, as perceived mainly by the ‘rural actors’ cluster. This was accompanied also by opportunism, although this is measured mainly on an individual basis. Only a few actors have demonstrated a relatively intense and efficient information exchange, and this based on interpersonal trust within the
grouping. In this line, some positive developments were observed as an effect of exogenous forces e.g. decentralisation, which is in effect due to the EU membership. This has particularly increased the reputation of some actors in the rural cluster e.g. municipalities. However, the measurement of impacts on cooperation and the revitalisation of social capital in the case study region are only in a preliminary phase owing to the ongoing transformation process as well as the limited power in restructuring the governance structure for the management of common pool resources. Building on our incomplete findings, we can conclude that the cooperation structure is dominated by individual interests and is not understood as a vital component of governance and the reduction of transaction costs. However, as far as the ‘network’ cluster is concerned (the grouping where the character and intensity of information exchange is rapidly growing), we may emphasise that the unidirectional and closed system with limited information exchange, which stems from the former communist period, is slowly opening up and initiating collective learning. Further dynamics of this cluster may generate additional expansion and thus increase the potential of the community in its self-organisation and governance.

Despite several contrasting features such as the high level of community identity or the positive opinion of agro-tourism, which were observed in research process, the national park is not perceived as a product of the regional economy but rather an economic barrier to the execution of private or common property rights and rural policies, although some positive initiatives such as Pan Parks were observed. Speculations arise here, as to whether this is the effect of the generally weak cooperation or of the opportunism of key actors, or indeed the result of the state’s failure to design an appropriate governance regime, since this problematic aspect has been considered as key in the social capital formation process. However, the behaviour of newly-established actors, especially the municipal self-government network, shows an openness to discussion and to formalisation of modern institutional components – based on participatory governance – into their rules of cooperation, which indicates that institutional collapse might be overcome and the system is approaching the release phase.

To sum up, the process of collective learning has already been initiated, but radical changes in governance structure and management of the park have been required in order to safeguard the high natural values of the Slovensky Raj national park as well
as the expansion of a sustainable rural economy. Despite these aspects, it is possible to conclude that cooperation has been gradually moving from the exogenous to endogenous level. A positive example of this can be observed in processes active in the ‘network’ cluster, particularly in the growing interest in agro-tourism within the tourism networks or the activities of self-governance within municipal networks. All of these are based on community actions, trust reconstruction and a growing public awareness of the elected authorities in the region and such networks seem to substitute the role of government.

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Annexes

Annex A: Interview Guidelines

Part I: Social capital, trust, co-operation

Introduction

1. Are you a member of regional, local group or association (of farmers, municipalities, tourism facilities) or other organisations and associations?
   If so please provide details:
   How many different social organizations are you involved in (including recreational groups, religious groups, community groups, self-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, governmental organizations etc)?

2. How did you become a member of the group (born into, voluntary choice, required, invited, or other)?

3. How would define your 'community'? (your household and immediate neighbours; your village/town; your region; other)

A: Role of trust/mistrust (social and institutional) and opportunism

4. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or you can not be too careful in dealing with people?

5. How much do you trust (on a scale from 1 to 5) the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Trust levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People from your ethnic or linguistic group</td>
<td>To a very great extent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from other ethnic or linguistic groups, minorities (e.g. Romas/gypsies)</td>
<td>To a great extent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government officials (mayors, local council)</td>
<td>Neither to a great nor small extent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional government officials (NUTS III Košice)</td>
<td>To a small extent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-government mun. networks (Association of municipalities SRNAP, Microregion Slovenský Raj-Sever)</td>
<td>To a very small extent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State authority in agriculture (regional department in Spišská Nová Ves)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration of National Park Slovenský Raj</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit organizations in environmental protection activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romas community centres and NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strangers (newcomers, foreigners, tourists)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National government officials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researchers, scientist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Have you had/or have you heard of any problems in dealing with any members of the group in the past? If so, please explain. How does this affect your behaviour toward them (your reaction in the case of broke trust)?

7. Do you think that the problem your group is addressing should be solved by the national government/local government or state agencies (rather than by the group you are working within)? Have you tried to get help from the government or state agencies? If so, what was the outcome?

**B: Role of communication and learning**

8. What are your main sources of information about what the government (both local and national) and the EU is doing?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Information</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relatives, friends and family ('word of mouth')</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community bulletin board</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local market/local shops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community or local newspaper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National newspaper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups or associations I am involved with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business or work colleagues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties I am involved with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental organizations I am involved with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. What are your main sources of information about what is happening within your community?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Information</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relatives, friends and family ('word of mouth')</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community bulletin board</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local market/local shops</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Community or local newspaper</td>
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<tr>
<td>National newspaper</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Internet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community leaders</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Groups or associations I am involved with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business or work colleagues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties I am involved with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental organizations I am involved with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. As a group member, do you think that you have enough information?

A: If no, do you feel that it is to your disadvantage that others know more than you? And how does this affect the activities of the group and your own performance?
B: If no, what kind of information would you like to receive?

11. What are the main difficulties you experience in communicating with others in the group?

A: Can you identify a blockage in the sharing of information? (Where cooperation could be enhanced or achieved if there was more information?)
B: Do you think there are there some people within the group who withhold information? (If yes, what type of information, and for what reason?)

12. How frequent/often do you discuss issues relating to the project/initiative with other members of the group?
B: Do you think that there is intensive/good dialogue amongst the group members, or just on the rare occasions?

13. What do you value as the most important knowledge that you obtain since the time you worked in your organization? Have you changed your opinion or behaviour toward the other actors since the time you are member of organization?

C: Role of transaction costs and governance structures of cooperation

14. Can you think of any factors that would affect your willingness to work with other people?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>factors</th>
<th>To a very great extent</th>
<th>To a great extent</th>
<th>Neither to a great nor small extent</th>
<th>To a small extent</th>
<th>To a very small extent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geographical distance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives, motivations (economical, environmental protection…)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background of relationships (history)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in the group – cooperation with the people who are not currently part of the group</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal relationships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. What are your costs (money, time) of the meetings monthly?
A: Internal (within your organization)
B. External
16. In your opinion, do you think that membership in your organisation is benefit or lost? What is the main benefit from joining the group (excess to services, cases of emergency, benefits, social status, and other)?

D: Role of the state - national, regional, EU laws – and the formal institutional environment on cooperation

17. Do you think that this initiative could have been possible in former socialist times? If no: For what main reason? (market not existing, mistrust, no motivation to cooperate, etc).

18. Do you think that people’s attitude toward each other, and how they interact with each other have changed since socialist times? If yes: Give examples of how interaction has changed, with reference to the project/initiative.

19. A: In general, compared to time before 1989, has the trust/mistrust to local government improved, deteriorated, or stayed about the same?

   B: Have you had any bad experiences with the State and their organizations in the past?

20. How does accession to the EU affect people’s behaviour within the case study?

21. Are there more optimism for EU institutions rather than national ones?

E: Role of communities, social networks and informal institutions on cooperation

22. If a community project does not directly benefit you, but has benefits for many others in the village/-neighbourhood, would you be willing to contribute:

   money (Yes or No)  
   time (Yes or No)?

23. If there was a problem within your community which required different people coming together to solve it, how likely do you think they would be successful?

   Very likely  
   Somewhat likely  
   Neither likely or unlikely  
   Somewhat unlikely  
   Very unlikely

24. What mechanisms are in place to solve conflicts amongst the group? Are these mechanisms ‘formalized’ by the group (discussed and agreed upon by all in the group) or informal (common understanding amongst all in the group, but not written or discussed – for example evident when the respondent makes statements such as ‘you wouldn’t do that to a friend/neighbour)?

25. Who would you go to first if you experienced a problem within the group? Discrete options:
The individual who you thought was causing the problem
Have a meeting of the entire group
Address a ‘leader’ of the group
Someone outside the group to report it or sort it out
Other (specify)

26. How would you rank (on a scale from 1 to 5) the relative importance of the following factors affecting the cooperation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Neither important nor unimportant</th>
<th>Somewhat unimportant</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High levels of trust within the community</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Past experiences of all stakeholders with working together</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a highly motivated group of people/community who are willing to cooperate</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having good communication between all actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping well informed and having enough information to make decisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors understanding each other and sharing the same objectives</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Involvement of governmental agencies in the process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active involvement of the local community</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market driven incentives for cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27. How strong is the feeling of togetherness or closeness in your village/Neighbourhood? (community identity) Use a five point scale where 1 means feeling very distant and 5 means feeling very close.

28. In your opinion, can be National Park take as the identity of your community? Specify:

F: Role of the market and competition in fostering/hindering cooperation

29. Do you know the concept of sustainable tourism and agro-tourism? What do you imagine under it?

30. Which alternative do you apply (farmers) / support (municipality, associations)
A: Agro-tourism practices
B: Traditional farming

31. Which activities related to agro-tourism are of your interest (e.g. recreation, horse riding, accommodation of tourists, or specify others)
32. Is this a new product that is created, or does it involved the marketing of older established products?
Can you identify displacement (the market product that is being created, as 'displaced' from another area or group of producers for example one area becoming a tourist destination at the expense of another area; or increase in the consumption of a particular product at the expense of another)?

33. How competitive is the project/group within the market? (How secure is the market the product is operating within? (Does the product require active marketing – such as advertising the area as a tourist destination)

34. What are the most relevant problems of your community /ranking on scale/ ?

Unemployment (lack of job opportunities)
Environmental protection
Economic problems
Inefficient infrastructure (roads, community services, others)
Social problems (conflicts, relationships, image of community, others)
Others…………………………

35. Do you think that tourism (sustainable tourism, agro-tourism) related activities are possible solution to the situation (economical, social) in your region?
Or: Do you have another idea about the solution of the current problems in your region?
If yes: Do you work on this idea?
Annex B: List of Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>municipalities</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Smizany</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.5.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Letanovce</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.5.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Hrabusice</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.5.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Betlanovce</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.5.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Spisske Tomasovce</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.5.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Arnutovce</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.5.2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

self-government municipal networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>municipalities</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. Zaujmove zdruzenie obci SRNAP</td>
<td>Association of municipalities SRNAP</td>
<td>9.5.2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

tourism networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>municipalities</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. Spisska Regionalna Rozvojoja Agentura</td>
<td>Regional Development Agency</td>
<td>11.5.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Obcianske Zdruzenie pre rozvoj agroturizmu</td>
<td>Civic Association for agrotourism</td>
<td>20.5.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Slovensky Zvaz Vidieckeho Turizmu</td>
<td>Slovak Associations for Rural tourism</td>
<td>11.7.2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

non profit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>municipalities</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15. Slovensky Zvaz Ochrancov Priody a Krajiny</td>
<td>Environmental NGOs</td>
<td>13.5.2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Park Administration | 12.5.2005 |

18. Regional governemnet | 19.5.2005 |

19. State authority in agriculture | 18.5.2005 |

farmers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>municipalities</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20. Ranch u Trapper</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.5.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Type of Adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>p. Bena</td>
<td>adopters of agro-tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Ranc - Hodkovce</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Agrospis</td>
<td>mix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>PD Smizany</td>
<td>non-adopters of agro-tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Hamracek</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Palfy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**discarded interviews**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Turisticke informace centrum</td>
<td>touristic information centre</td>
<td>11.5.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Polnohospodarske družstvo - Odorin</td>
<td>cooperative - Odorin</td>
<td>11.7.2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C. Statistical Data

c.1. Agriculture and forestry
The region is rich in forest land, which covers 32 731 ha. This is a precondition for forestry. Forest ownership structure: state forest 57.72%, municipal 11.90%, city forest 10.59%, church forest 14.86%, and association of private forest owners 2.43%, individual owners 2.5%. Agricultural land consumes 21 460 ha of the region. Most of the agricultural area is meadows (10 127 ha), and arable land (9 673 ha). Gardens take up 526 ha and orchards cover 134 ha. There are no vineyards in the region. Traditional farming is concentrated on animal-breeding, however climate conditions of the region are suitable for agro-tourism.

Table 1: Soil structure in the Spiš region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>soils:</th>
<th>ha</th>
<th>soils:</th>
<th>ha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agricultural land</td>
<td></td>
<td>non-agricultural land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arable land</td>
<td>21460</td>
<td>forest</td>
<td>32731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gardens</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>water area</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>orchards</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>settlement</td>
<td>2782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meadows</td>
<td>10127</td>
<td>others</td>
<td>1316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Office Košice, 2003

c.2 Population and economy
The region has 94 584 inhabitants, 47 965 of whom are women, and 46 619 men. Almost 59 % of inhabitants are within the productive age of 15 – 54 years old.

Table 2: Age structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age structure</th>
<th>number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>women</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>men</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under-product.</td>
<td>20951</td>
<td>22.15</td>
<td>10301</td>
<td>21.48</td>
<td>10650</td>
<td>22.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive</td>
<td>59460</td>
<td>62.86</td>
<td>28186</td>
<td>58.76</td>
<td>31274</td>
<td>67.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postproductive</td>
<td>14173</td>
<td>14.98</td>
<td>9478</td>
<td>19.76</td>
<td>4695</td>
<td>10.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Office Košice, 2003

The economic situation in the target region is affected by regional disparities based on asymmetrical distribution of human resources, infrastructure, and also on geographical barriers (mountainous relief). Brief illustration can be provided by basis
characteristics, e.g. GDP per capita\textsuperscript{49} of Kosice region amounts 41.3\%, unemployment 22\%. The total number of women unemployed makes up 44.49 \% of the total unemployed.

c. 3. Tourism
Tourism in the region is generally underdeveloped. Total number of tourists visiting the region in 2003 was 320 856 /Figure 2/. Slovak visitors made up 65.44 \% and foreign visitors 34.56 \% of total visitor numbers, with the average length of stay 2.5 nights. Utilisation of permanent beds amounted 22\% compared to High Tatras 39\% it is very low. The structure of accommodation facilities is in figure1. Tourist accommodation facilities in the region are situated at the border of the park in adjacent municipalities. They include mostly owners of small enterprises - bed and breakfast facilities, which are mainly family businesses.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Accommodation Facilities in Spišská Nová Ves district}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source:} Statistics Office Košice, 2002

\textsuperscript{49} PPS of EU 15.
Figure 2

Source: Statistics Office Košice, 2003